We may fairly assume, that the judges and principal officers in the departments will be able well informed
men in their respective branches of business; that they will, from experience, be best informed as to proper
persons to fill inferior offices in them; that they will feel themselves responsible for the execution of their
several branches of business, and for the conduct of the officers they may appoint therein. From these, and
other considerations, I think we may infer, that impartial and judicious appointments of subordinate officers
will, generally, be made by the courts of law, and the heads of departments. This power of distributing
appointments, as circumstances may require, into several hands, in a well formed disinterested legislature,
might be of essential service not only in promoting beneficial appointments, but also in preserving the balance
in government. A feeble executive may be strengthened and supported by placing in its hands more numerous
appointments.....
Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to some superior power. Hence it
is that the true policy of a republican government is, to frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned
in the government, are made accountable to some superior for their conduct in office. This responsibility should ultimately
rest with the people. To have a government well administered in all its parts, it is requisite the different departments of
it should be separated and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legislative power should be in one body, the executive
in another, and the judicial in one different from either. But still each of these bodies should be accountable for their conduct....
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I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I suppose it
a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible. But I say, this system has followed
the English government in this, while it has departed from almost every other principle of their jurisprudence,
under the idea, of rendering the judges independent; which, in the British constitution, means no more than
that they hold their places during good behavior, and have fixed salaries . . . [the authors of the constitution]
have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any of
their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controlled by the laws of
the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under
heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself. Before I proceed
to illustrate the tuth of these reflections....
New-York Journal:
What latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say. At first view, one would suppose, that it meant
no more than this, that the courts under the general government should exercise, not only the powers of courts of law, but also
that of courts of equity, in the manner in which those powers are usually exercised in the different states. But this cannot be
the meaning, because the next clause authorises the courts to take cognizance of all cases in law and equity arising under the laws
of the United States; this last article, I conceive, conveys as much power to the general judicial as any of the state courts possess....
 
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