To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion
are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the
internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the
militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the
public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual
intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit
them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to
their usefulness....
To the People of the State of New York:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all
subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection
or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed
either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong
interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater
than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space;
and all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and
politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end;
that every power ought to be commensurate with its object....
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To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for
the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military
arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in
respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support
of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and,
in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The
conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation,
in one shape or another....
To the People of the State of New York:
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be
apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money,
because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of
the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local
purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to
allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should
possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their
own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and
exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and
unqualified sense....
 
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