To the People of the State of New York:
THE third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens
which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most
extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it
strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue....
To the People of the State of New York:
THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution
which authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It
is in these words: "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives
shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law,
make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators."1 This provision has not only
been declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been censured by
those who have objected with less latitude and greater moderation; and, in one instance it has been
thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the
system....
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To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a
supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of
population may demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following
observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from
a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is
beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution will not suffer
by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of the
number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first instance is declared to be
temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years....
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not,
without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the
other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is
not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the
representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged,
that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in
exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it
impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to
be the most chimerical....
 
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