To the People of the State of New York:
THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention,
when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification,
however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the
counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the
power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the
effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded
little or no additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered,
by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan. The
different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all
dispassionate and discerning men....
To the People of the State of New York:
A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character.
Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be
forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the
national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less
necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one
is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts,
that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in
doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or
momentary interest....
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To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections
against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which
this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The
appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The
number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a
more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a
representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years
are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial
trust....
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular
measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on
this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed
Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.
The second section gives power to the President, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to
make treaties, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce;
and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest
security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most
conducive to the public good....
 
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